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NOTES

The second method also appears to be more logically reasoned in
that it is based upon sound agency principles, whereas the first
method is based upon fiction.

Wilbur D. Short

INDICTMENT AND INFORMATIONKENTUCKY CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS AND PROPOSED
CHANGES IN THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
At the present time Kentucky, by statute, allows the use of the
information in circuit courts for the prosecution of certain misdemeanors, and for all offenses within the jurisdiction of courts inferior
to the circuit court.1 The purpose of this paper is to ascertain the
extent to which the information may be used in Kentucky and to
examine its possible future uses.
Analysis of Constitution

The Kentucky Constitution § 12 provides:
No person, for an indictable offense, shall be proceeded against
criminally by information, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service, in time of war or
public danger, or by leave of court for oppression or misdemeanor
in office.

Since the exceptions within this section are extremely limited,
no particular importance is attached to them in the development of
this paper.
This provision, on its face, would appear to prohibit the use of
the information in all cases in which the indictment may be used,
and since the present use of the information 2 overlaps the permitted
uses of the indictment, it would appear that the present use of the
information is partly unconstitutional. However, such a literal interpretation has not been adopted by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
The court has wisely limited the application of the constitutional
provision which otherwise would have tied the hands of a prosecut1 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 455.080 (1959) provides in part:
In circuit court, persons charged with misdemeanors for which the
highest penalty that may be imposed is a fine of one hundred dollars
and imprisonment for fifty days may be prosecuted . . .by information
filed by the Commonwealths attorney or county attorney in the circuit court. In courts inferior to circuit courts, any offense within the
jurisdiction of the court may be prosecuted on [an] . . .information
filed before the judge or justice.
2Ky. Rev. Stat. § 455.080 (1959).
a3y Grim. Code § 9 (1959). The indictment or information may be used
in the circuit courts for offenses having punishments of not more than one hundred
dollars and imprisonment for fifty days.
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ing attorney in the inferior courts in situations where a complaining
witness refused to swear out a warrant.
In Lakes v. Goodloe4 the court said that it had consistently held
that the term "indictable offense," as used in section 12 of the Kentucky Constitution, has reference to common-law offenses or to stat-

utory offenses, the punishments for which are "infamous"; and that
"infamous" punishment in this jurisdiction is death or imprisonment
in the penitentiary of the state following a conviction of a felony.
There are no Kentucky cases which conflict with the views expressed
in the Lakes case.
Having found that section 12 applies to common-law and statutory
felonies, the constitutional limits on the use of the information may
be ascertained by reference to a statutory definition of offenses.
Kentucky defines public offenses as follows:
Offenses are either felonies or misdemeanors. Offenses punishable with death or confinement in the penitentiary are felonies. All
other offenses, whether at common law or made so by statute, are
misdemeanors. 5

Thus, it may be said that all misdemeanors in Kentucky may constitutionally be prosecuted by information, since section 12 of the
Kentucky Constitution

only prohibits its use in cases involving

felonies. 6 The present limits imposed on the use of the information
in prosecuting misdemeanors in Kentucky are those imposed by statute
upon the circuit court7

Expanding The Use of The Information
Prosecution by information is more efficient than prosecution by

indictment. It is cheaper, it saves time, and it properly centers
responsibility upon the prosecutor for actions which are largely
under his control.8 Even where the indictment is used, the Grand
Jury may serve merely to rubber stamp the opinion of the prosecut-

ing attorney.9
4 195 Ky. 240.252, 242 S.W. 682, 639 (1922).

56 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 431.060 (1959); See also Ky. Crim. Code §§ 5-7 (1959).
Lakes v. Goodloe, 195 Ky. 240, 242 S.W. 632 (1922). The holding in the
Lakes case on this point finds support in the following cases: Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 314 Ky. 369, 235 S.W. 2d 771 (1951); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Commonwealth, 175 Ky. 372, 194 S.W. 315 (1917); Ford v. Moss, Judge, 124 Ky. 288,
98 S.W. 1015 (1907); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Commonwealth, 112 Ky. 635, 66
S.W. 505 (1902); Lowry v. Commonwealth, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 481, 86 S.W. 1117
(1896).
7 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 455.080 (1959); See Singleton v. Commonwealth, 306 Ky.
454, 208 S.W. 2d 325 (1948) and Commonwealth v. Lay, 202 Ky. 683, 261
S.W. 87 (1924).
Miller, 'Informations or Indictments in Felony Cases," 8 Minn. L. Rev.
379 (1924) i Moley, "The Initiation of Criminal Prosecutions by Indictment or
Information,' 29 Mich. L. Rev. 403 (1931); but Cf. Dession, "From Indictment
to Information-Implications
of the Shift," 42 Yale L; J.163 (1932).
9
Potts, "Waiver of Indictment in Felony Cases, 3 Sw. L. J. 437, 447 (1949).
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In days when there was no organized police force and no prosecuting attorney, the grand jury rendered an invaluable service in
initiating prosecutions after a crime was committed. Today, these
conditions do not exist. By virtue of an organized police force,
prosecuting attorney and greater communication facilities, most of
the cases considered by the grand jury are ones in which arrests
have already been made, preliminary hearings have been held, and
the prisoners are being held in jail or have been released on bail.10
Generally a prosecuting attorney of any training and judgment
would not "be so apt to respond to public hysteria or to private
importunity as would the grand jury."" Persons related to, or
closely connected with the prosecutor or the accused may be on the
grand jury as may persons who have a strong personal opinion or
pecuniary interest in the matters to be dealt with. Such persons
should not be on grand juries, but frequently are.
Having justified expanding the use of the information, the problem arises as to what extent it may be used in felony cases. While
section 12 of the Kentucky Constitution gives a defendant the right
to be prosecuted by indictment in a felony case, there exists a possibility that he might waive this right and be tried on an information for a felony.
In the federal courts, Rule 7(a) and (b )12 permits prosecution
of non-capital felonies by information, if the defendant, "after he
has been advised of the nature of the charge and of his rights, waives
in open court prosecution by indictment."13 This rule has been held
to be constitutional, 14 even though the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States provides that "No person shall be
held to answer to a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a grand jury."15
A majority of states now permit prosecution of indictable offenses by information or permit waiver if felonies are required to
be prosecuted by indictment. 16 The arguments presented above in
support of the information are equally applicable to permitting waiver
of indictments. 1 7 It may further be said that to refuse waiver may
work an enormous hardship on an indigent person who is unable to
3oMiller "Informations or Indictments in Felony Cases," 8
379, 389 (1924).
11 Id. at 401.
12 Fed. R. Crim. P. (1946).
13 Fed. R. Crim. P. 7 (b) (1946).
14 Barkman v. Sandford, 162 F. 2d 592 (5th Cir. 1947).
15 For discussion of other constitutional rights which may
federal courts see United States v. Gill, 55 F. 2d 899 (D. N. M.
dominant
rationale in such cases see Patton v. United States, 281 U.
16
Note, 1 Texas Law and Leg. 22, n. 25 (1947).
17 Note, 1 Texas Law and Leg. 22 (1947).

Minn. L. Rev.

be waived in
1931); for the
S. 276 (1930).
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make bail and must be kept in jail until the grand jury convenes,
which may be as seldom as twice a year in some areas of the country.
However, some states refuse to permit waiver of indictment.
In People ex rel. Battistav. Christian'8 the New York Court of Appeals
held a statute permitting waiver of indictment void as being contrary to a state constitutional provision requiring that no person
should be held to answer for an infamous crime unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury. 9 In holding that the right to an
indictment could not be waived, the court said:
[T]he rule can be deduced that waiver is not permitted where a
question of jurisdiction or fundamental rights is involved and public
injury would result. A privilege, merely personal, may be waived; a
public fundamental right, the exercise of which is requisite to jurisdiction to try, condemn, and punish, is binding upon the individual,
and cannot be disregarded by him. The public policy of the state
as expressed in the Constitution takes precedence over his personal
wish or convenience... 20

Kentucky apparently has chosen to follow New York in this area
of the law, for in Singleton v. Commonwealth2' the Kentucky Court
of Appeals seemingly reached a similar conclusion in an opinion
which relied on the Christian case for support. Singleton merely involved waiver in a misdemeanor case in the circuit court for an
22
offense that statutorily could only be prosecuted by indictment.
However, it is believed that this opinion would be followed all the
more in a case involving waiver of an indictment in a felony case
where prosecution was sought on an information.
Even though the information might not constitutionally be extended to cover prosecution of felonies, its use may be expanded to
cover more or all misdemeanors prosecuted in the circuit courts
under the present Kentucky Constitution. It should be noted that
the present limits on the use of the information in circuit courts are
the same as those enacted in 189828 when the use of the information
was first permitted in Kentucky. In 1893 the concurrent jurisdictional limits of circuit and inferior courts were the same as the limits
imposed on the information. 24 It apparently was intended that
use of the information be allowed in circuit courts only to the extent
it was permitted in the inferior courts. Since that time, the con18249 N.Y. 314, 164 N.E. 111 (1928); Comment, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 319 (1929).
19 N. Y. Const. art. 1, § 6.
20People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249 N.Y. 314, 315, 164 N.E. 111, 112

(1928).
21 306 Ky. 454, 208 S.W. 2d 325 (1948).
22
Commonwealth v. Lay, 202 Ky. 683, 261 S.W. 7 (1924).
2
243Ky.

Acts (1893), ch. 182 § 15.

Ky. Acts (1893), ch. 221 § 67 (Justices' Courts); Ky. Const. § 143 (Police

Courts); Ky. Crim. Code § 13(6) (1959) (County Courts).
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current jurisdictional limits of inferior courts have been extended
to "five hundred dollars or twelve months."2 5 This alone might justify
an extension in the use of the information to this extent, at the
circuit court level.
In view of the reasons discussed above in favor of the information, it is felt that its use should be extended to cover all prosecutions for misdemeanors in circuit courts. Such an extension would
relieve the grand jury of hearing cases involving misdemeanors where
the defendant desires to plead guilty or where the prosecutor has
sufficient evidence to act without the approval of the grand jury.
To this extent the grand jury would have more time to investigate
public officials and the management of public
institutions, which are
26
perhaps its most important functions today.
Wilbur D. Short
2

GKy. Rev. Stat. § 25.010 (1959); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 26.010 (1959).
26 The powers of the grand jury to investigate are set forth in Ky. Grim.

Code § 102 (1959).

